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PENNWALT CORP. v. DURAND-WAYLAND, INC.-THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT REDEFINES THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
INTRODUCTION
Courts analyze patent infringement' questions by looking at the literal
language of the patent claims2 and determining whether the alleged infringer's
device or product falls within the scope of the claims.3 Additionally, the
courts have developed an equitable doctrine which finds infringement where
the accused device or composition of matter performs substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same
result, as the claimed invention.4 This is the Doctrine of Equivalents ("the
Doctrine").'
The courts, in applying the Doctrine have refined it and shaped it into its
present form. One of the first refinements to the Doctrine was to extend its
application from cases involving mechanical devices to cases involving com-
positions of matter. 6 A number of other refinements have developed as well:
1. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376, (1982 and Supp. III 1985) defines the requirements
necessary to obtain a patent and the rights of the patentee under the Act. In particular, 35
U.S.C. § 154 provides that "[e]very patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs
or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, .. . the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States ........ and 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(1982), provides that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention,
within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."
2. A patent is required to contain "one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1982). A claim consists of a preamble, transition and one or more elements. An element
is a limitation or narrowing of the scope of the claim. 4 D. CansuM, PATENTS § 18.03[41 (1986).
Therefore, claims define the invention for purposes of infringement. 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS §
8.01. See infra note 34 for a discussion of claim style development.
3. This is literal infringement. See, e.g., Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete
Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 257 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[lliteral infringement requires that the accused
device embody every element of the claim.").
4. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (where
devices perform equivalent functions, though form may be different, infringement occurs);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (where device substantially embodies patent's
mode of operation and achieves same result infringement occurs).
5. See 6 Liscomin, Lipscoma's WALKER ON PATENTS § 22:34-49 (3d ed. 1987) (discussion
of origins and scope of the Doctrine).
6. Minerals Separation v. Butte Mining Co., 250 U.S. 336, 354 (1919) (defendant avoided
infringement by using more than 1% oil, whereas patent called for use of fraction of 1% oil);
Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1869); (in holding that substitution of 72 parts of
naphtha was not equivalent to 28 parts of kerosene, the court stated, "[tlhis term 'equivalent,'
when speaking of machines, has a certain definite meaning; but when used with regard to the
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1) the Doctrine may be used against the patentee as well as in favor of the
patentee, that is, the reverse doctrine of equivalents; 7 2) the Doctrine applies
to both pioneer, major improvement, and, minor improvement patents,
although the allowed range of equivalents depends on the degree of improve-
ment;8 and, 3) the range of allowed equivalents must be determined in view
of the file wrapper or prosecution history and the prior art. 9
As the Doctrine entered the 1980's, a question arose as to whether in-
fringement under it should be determined by looking at the invention as a
whole or on an element-by-element basis. Since 1983, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit' ° has used both methods to determine
infringement under the Doctrine,' thus creating inconsistency in the test
chemical action of such fluids as can be discovered only by experiment, it only means equally
good."). See also 4 D. CHisuM, supra note 2, § 18.02 [1]-121. But see Graver Tank, 339 U.S.
at 612 (holding that substitution of manganese for patentee's magnesium infringed plaintiff's
patent); Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. Frank S. De Ronde Co., 146 F. 988, 993 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1906) (holding that substitution of acetone for alcohol infringed plaintiff's patent).
7. The reverse doctrine of equivalents excuses accused devices that fall within the literal
language of the claims, when the accused device performs the same function in a substantially
different way. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1898).
A modern example of the reverse doctrine of equivalents is Leesona Corp. v. United States,
530 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In Leesona, the claims in suit related to an electrode for a battery.
Although the accused electrode fit the description of the electrode in the claims, the court
found that the accused electrode was not intended to perform the function of the patented
electrode and in fact did not perform the same function as the patented electrode. Therefore,
the court found no infringement. Id. at 905-06.
8. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1908)
(range of equivalents depends upon and varies with degree of invention, such as, pioneer
improvement).
9. The file wrapper is the Patent and Trademark Offices's official record of the proceedings
on a patent application. The official record of the proceedings is also referred to as the
prosecution history of the patent application. File wrapper and prosecution history have come
to mean the same thing and will be used interchangeably. The Doctrine of File Wrapper Estoppel
precludes a patentee from reclaiming subject matter in a claim which he surrendered during
prosecution. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942). It is also
well-known that file wrapper estoppel supersedes the Doctrine. Lewis v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 228
F.2d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 1956). However, file wrapper estoppel does not entirely preclude the
use of the Doctrine. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983). See also Southern Textile Mach. Co. v. United Hosiery Mills Corp., 33 F.2d 862, 886
(6th Cir. 1929) ("the estoppel should go no further than to bar the patentee from reliance upon
the cancelled claim in its broadest or generic construction."). For a detailed analysis of file
wrapper estoppel, see 4 D. CmisuM, supra note 2, § 18.05 (1986).
10. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text for discussion of the creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
11. Compare Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 846 F.2d 1369, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1886, reh'g denied en
banc, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (no infringement found when invention as a whole
was considered) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (the Doctrine applies to invention as a whole) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (employing element-by-element analysis and finding
no infringement) and Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that it is "well settled" that infringement under the Doctrine requires presence of every element
or its substantial equivalent).
[Vol. 38:787
1989] PENNWALT CORP. v. DURAND-WAYLAND, INC. 789
used to determine infringement.12
The Federal Circuit resolved this inconsistency in favor of an element-by-
element analysis in the case of Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand- Wayland Inc.'3
In Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit reviewed the issues of literal infringement
and infringement under the Doctrine 4 and found the patent infringed under
neither analysis. 5 Nonetheless, the majority established an analytical test to
determine infringement under the Doctrine. The dissent, however, accused
the majority of contravening Supreme Court precedent in establishing its
test.' 6 The Pennwalt decision evoked strong feelings among the justices, as
evidenced not only by the majority and dissenting opinions, but by the
additional views 7 and commentary 8 filed by two of the justices.
This Casenote will demonstrate that the Federal Circuit's element-by-
element test for infringement under the Doctrine not only overrules several
Federal Circuit precedents but also in essence overrules a United States
Supreme Court precedent. This Casenote will also discuss how the Federal
Circuit, in creating an analytical test, has essentially transformed the test for
infringement under the Doctrine into a modified version of the test for literal
infringement. Finally, this Casenote will examine how the adoption of the
element-by-element test will affect patent law in general and infringement
litigation in particular.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress
to promote science and the useful arts by granting authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries for a limited
time. 9 Based on this provision of the Constitution, Congress has enacted
12. Harris, Three Ambiguities of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Federal Circuit, 69 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 91 (1987). The three ambiguities referred to by the author are: 1) varying
statements of the basic test, such as, achieves substantially the same result versus achieves the
same result; 2) element-by-element comparison versus invention as a whole comparison; and,
3) relationship between the Doctrine and the 35 U.S.C. § 112 equivalence doctrine. Id. at 91-
92.
13. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1226, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1474 (1988).
14. 833 F.2d at 933-39.
15. Id. at 939.
16. Id. at 945 (dissent alleged that majority's opinion departed from teachings of Graver
Tank).
17. Id. at 949-54 (Nies, J., additional views).
18. Id. at 954 (Newman, J., commentary).
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."
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and amended laws which regulate the granting and enforcement of patents. 20
In general, United States patent laws grant an inventor the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling his invention within the United States.2
Therefore, anyone who makes, uses, or sells a patented invention throughout
the United States during the term of the patent (seventeen years), infringes
the patent.
22
Literal infringement of a patent occurs when the accused device or com-
position possesses all the elements present in one or more claims of a valid
patent. 23 In addition, a court may find infringement under the Doctrine even
though a device or composition does not fall within the literal meaning of
a patent claim. The Doctrine allows expansion of the claims beyond their
literal meaning in order to ensure that a potential infringer does not circum-
vent a patent by merely changing the form of an invention while copying
its substance.
2 4
The Doctrine first appeared in the Supreme Court case of Winans v.
Denmead.25 The Winans patent involved a railroad coal car in the shape of
a cone,2 6 whereas the defendant constructed coal cars that were octagonal
in shape. 27 A sharply-divided Supreme Court (5-4) reversed the decision of
the lower court and found that defendant's coal car did infringe the Winans
patent. 2 The majority in Winans stated that where form and function are
separable, it is the duty of the court to look through the form to the
substance of the invention. 29 Here it would be unreasonable to apply the
20. The first patent statute was the Act of 1790, Ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790). This
was followed by the 1793 Act, the 1832 Act, the 1870 Act, and the 1952 Act. See infra note
34 for more details.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). See supra note I for text of statute.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). See supra note 1 for text of statute.
23. See supra note 3.
24. But see General Dynamics Corp. v. Whitcomb, 443 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1971) (differences
in form and shape weigh importantly in the balance where form is the essence of invention);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (when form and substance are inseparable,
it is enough to look at form only).
25. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
26. The claim of the Winans patent read:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters patent, is making the
body of a car for the transportation of coal, etc., in the form of a frustum of a
cone, substantially as herein described, whereby the force exerted by the weight of
the load presses equally in all directions, and does not tend to change the form
thereof, so that every part resists its equal proportion, and by which, also, the
lower part is so reduced as to pass down within the truck frame and between the
axles, to lower the centre of gravity of the load without diminishing the capacity
of the car as described.
Id. at 340.
27. Id. at 341.
28. Id. (district court held that patentee's claim was limited to particular form mentioned
in specification, such as, conical, and because defendant's car was not conical, there was no
infringement).
29. Id. at 343 ("It]he exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are
at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportion.").
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term "cone" literally, because the car's storage departments were basically
circular in shape. The question the Court focused on was: how close to a
circle must a car be in order to infringe?3° The majority answered the question
by stating that a car must be close enough to a circle to substantially embody
the patentee's mode of operation and attain the same kind of result as the
patentee's invention.3" Applying this test to the case, the Winans Court found
that the octagonal shape was substantially the same as the circular shape,
attained the same kind of result as the patented invention, and therefore
infringed the patented invention. 2
Justice Campbell, author of the dissent, argued that the patent should be
limited to the circular shape, as in literal infringement.33 The dissent pointed
to the then existing patent law which required a patentee to particularly
specify and point out what he claimed as his invention.14 Since the plaintiff
30. Id. at 343-44. "In practice, deviations from a true circle will always occur. How near
to a circle, then, must a car be in order to infringe? May it be slightly elliptical, or otherwise
depart from a true circle, and, if so, how far?" Id.
31. Id. at 344 ("[iun our judgment, the only answer that can be given to these questions is,
that it must be so near to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached by his invention.").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (reason for limiting patentee to circular form was
that only that form was specifically claimed).
34. Id. The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836), provided that an applicant
for patent "shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination,
which he claims as his own invention or discovery." It should be pointed out that claims and
patent examination were first required by the Patent Act of 1836. A detailed historical perspective
of the United States patent statutes may be found in 1 A.W. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS, § 1-11
(2d ed. 1971). A brief historical summary is present here so that the reader may better understand
the reasoning employed by the courts in these cases.
The first United States patent statute was the Act of 1790 which required a specification in
writing. The specification was required to contain a description and explanation of the invention
in such particular detail as to not only distinguish the invention from other things before known
and used but to enable a person skilled in the art to make, construct or use the invention. Act
of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790). The Patent Act of 1793 provided that an
inventor deliver a written description of his invention which distinguished it from all other
things before known. The 1793 Act also allowed a defendant in an infringement suit the defenses
of lack of novelty and prior use. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (novelty
means new or not previously known by others in United States; prior use of an invention is
one that must be accessible to public, for example, no attempt to conceal or keep invention
secret).
As stated above in this footnote, the Patent Act of 1836 first required the presence of claims
and examination of patent applications. However, as shown in note 26, supra, the claims merely
stated the broad features of a patentee's invention with a phrase such as "substantially herein
described." The drawings and specifications were the main features of the patent. I A.W.
DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 4, 9 (2d ed. 1971). Infringement was still determined by looking at
the specification. It was not until 1870 that an inventor was required to particularly point out
and distinctly claim his invention. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870).
Thus, the Patent Act of 1870 began the move toward specificity of claims and increased the
importance of claims versus the specification. It is now accepted that it is the claims and not
the specification which determine the subject matter of the invention. See, e.g., Application of
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confined his claim to conical form and did not mention any other form in
the specification, the dissent reasoned that the defendant's car did not
infringe the Winans patent.15 The dissent also believed that the policy adopted
by the majority would be injurious to labor and increase the volume of
litigation .36
Later decisions have refined the Winans definition of the Doctrine. One
refinement is that although various classes of inventions are entitled to
protection under the Doctrine, the range of equivalents allowed each class
of invention will be different.37 Inventions are generally divided into three
classes or categories:" 1) pioneer inventions which are entitled to a broad
range of equivalents;39 2) marked improvement inventions which are entitled
to a substantial range of equivalents;4° and, 3) narrow improvement inven-
tions which are entitled to a limited or nonexistent range equivalents. 4 1
Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 548 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (it is language of the claims which must
particularly point out and distinctly claim subject matter which applicant considers his invention).
The method of defining an invention prior to 1870 has been described as the central
definition system, whereas the method of defining an invention after 1870 has been described
as the peripheral definition system. 1. A.W. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 5-7 (2d. ed. 1971).
The central definition claim is a narrow claim with a typical embodiment to which the courts
give broad interpretations, including all equivalent constructions. The claim in Winans is an
example of a central type claim. See supra note 24. A peripheral definition claim marks the
metes and bounds of the invention, analogous to a fence around a property. A peripheral type
claim contains definitions of the elements or steps. An example of a peripheral type claim is:
"A widget comprising a bell, a book, a candle and means for lighting said candle." 4 D.
CHisum, supra note 2, § 18.03[5]. Today claims are required to be written as peripheral type
claims.
35. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. See generally 4 D. Citsum, supra note 2, § 18.04[2]. See also Continental Paper Bag
Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding that pioneer inventions are not
the only inventions entitled to protection under the Doctrine).
38. 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 2, § 18.04[2].
39. The concept of a pioneer invention was first recognized in Morley Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889). A pioneer invention is one in which the device or function
as a whole is new or an invention of such importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress
of the art versus an improvement on something already known. Examples of pioneer inventions
are the sewing machine, the electrical telegraph, the telephone. Corning Glass Works v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 374 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that pioneer patent is entitled
to wide breadth of protection).
40. Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1974) (court held that
a marked improvement is entitled to substantial range of equivalents); Acme Highway Prod.
Corp. v. D.S. Brown Co., 473 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1973) (patent which represents significant
improvement over the prior art is entitled to liberal range of equivalents; Acme patent related
to seals for highway joints which were substantially improved over the prior art as evidenced
by its success); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 416 F.2d
10, 11 (5th Cir. 1969) (patent is entitled to fair range of equivalents).
41. Bolkcom v. Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 503 (6th Cir. 1975) (where patent represents
small but significant advance, the Doctrine is given a narrow range); McCutchen v. Singer Co.,
386 F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[a] patentee who has made only a narrow improvement is
restricted to his improvement .... "); Deitel v. Unique Specialty Corp., 54 F.2d 359, 360 (2d.
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Additionally, patents on combinations of old elements have been classified
as narrow improvement patents .42
The Doctrine has been further refined and held subservient to the doctrine
of file wrapper or prosecution history estoppel.4 After the enactment of the
Patent Act of 1870, the Supreme Court recognized that both the prior art
and the file wrapper must be considered in interpreting the claims of a
patent. 4 If a patent applicant narrows his claims by amendment or cancel-
lation in order to establish patentability, the patent applicant's file wrapper
will be modified accordingly. The applicant cannot later "recapture" the
claims or parts of the claims that he previously surrendered. 45 Thus, file
wrapper estoppel limits the scope of the Doctrine as applied to a particular
device. Yet another refinement is that the Doctrine may be used against the
patentee. This occurs when a device falls within the literal words of a claim
but accomplishes the same result in a substantially different way. Under
these circumstances the Doctrine restricts the claim and defeats the infringe-
ment action. This is the reverse doctrine of equivalents.4
The Doctrine was created when central type claims, such as the Winans
claims, were used, but as claims requiring definition through identification
of the peripheral aspects of a device became more prevalent, there was doubt
as to whether the Doctrine would survive.47 The Supreme Court directly
Cir. 1931) ("we can see no ground for resorting to the doctrine of equivalents when the claims
speak plainly and the invention is so a trifling step forward.").
42. Marvin Glass & Assoc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 448 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding
that device employing features well known in the art is not allowed broad range of equivalents).
43. See supra note 9.
44. Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S. 589 (1887) (holding that file wrapper is part of evidence
in the case and helps in proper construction of the claims).
45. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942) (holding that the Doctrine
may not be used to recapture claims which patentee has surrendered by amendment).
46. The origin of the reverse doctrine of equivalents is Westinghouse v. Boyden Power
Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898), where the Court stated:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the
latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent,
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute
has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.
Id. at 568.
See also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)
(where device performs same or similar function as patented device in a substantially different
way, but falls within literal words of the claim, the Doctrine may restrict the claim and defeat
patentee's action for infringement); 4 D. CmsuM, supra note 2, § 18.04[4]); Pigott, Equivalents
in Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y. 291 (1966).
47. See supra note 34. In fact, one commentator had predicted that the Doctrine would not
survive the Graver Tank decision. Tilton, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Cases, 32 J.
PAT. OFF Soc'y. 861 (1950). The author felt that the Court would have to choose between the
Doctrine that the claim measures the grant of the patent and the equitable doctrine of protecting
the patentee. Since the Court's tendency had been to limit patent monopolies in view of the
antitrust laws, the author felt the Court would do away with the Doctrine. Id. at 869.
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addressed this question and upheld the Doctrine in Graver Tank v. Linde
Air Prods.4 The patent at issue in Graver Tank dealt with fluxes used in
electric welding.4 9 The claims described a major element of the flux as any
alkaline earth metal silicate.5 0 The plaintiff used magnesium silicate which is
an alkaline earth metal silicate, whereas the defendant used manganese silicate
which is not an alkaline earth silicate.5 The Court found that defendant's
flux infringed the patentee's flux under the Doctrine. 52
In reaching its holding, the Court went through a detailed analysis of the
Doctrine and the reasons supporting the Doctrine's continued use. The Court
stated that outright duplication "is a dull and very rare type of infringement"
and, therefore, the inventor needs more than the literal words to protect his
invention.5 1 In describing the Doctrine, the Court held that equivalence should
not be determined by a strict formula nor should it be considered in an
absolute vacuum.5 4 According to the Court, the purpose of the Doctrine is
to prevent one from practicing a fraud on a patent.55
The Court in Graver Tank adopted the three-part test set out in Sanitary
Refrigerator Co. v. Winter.5 6 In Sanitary Refrigerator, the Supreme Court
stated that infringement under the Doctrine exists when a device: 1) performs
substantially the same function; 2) in substantially the same way; 3) to obtain
the same result. 57 If all three parts of the test are satisfied5" then the two
devices or compositions are the same even though their form may be dif-
ferent.5 9 Applying this test to the patent at issue, the Supreme Court found
48. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
49. Id. at 606.
50. Id. A broader set of claims stipulating any "silicates" had been held invalid by the
Supreme Court. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277
(1949), adhered to by, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
51. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
52. Id. at 611-12 (based on evidence in record, Court affirmed trial court's holding that
for all practical purposes manganese silicate could be effectually substituted for calcium and
magnesium silicates).
53. Id. at 607.
54. Id. at 609.
55. Id. at 608 (to practice fraud on a patent means that infringer would be allowed to steal
benefit of an invention).
56. 280 U.S. 30 (1929). The case involved a patent for a latch on a refrigerator. The
defendant's latch contained a shortened arm which operated on a lug whereas the patentee's
latch had a longer arm which operated on the curved upper surface of the keeper head. The
court found that the changes made in the accused device were not enough to avoid infringement.
Id. at 41.
57. Id. at 42.
58. A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact and is to be determined by the trier
of fact, and under appellate review should not be changed unless clearly erroneous. Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-10.
59. Id. at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphey, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 120, 125 (1878)) ("if
two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the
same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.").
[Vol. 38:787
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that manganese was equivalent to magnesium and, thus, there was infringe-
ment under the Doctrine. 60
The dissent in Graver Tank adopted the argument of the Winans dissent.
That is, an applicant is required to particularly point out and distinctly claim
his invention.61 Therefore, what is not specifically claimed is outside the field
of the patent. 62 According to the dissent, the Doctrine circumvents the
statutory requirement that the claims define the invention. 63 In order to
ensure that the public knows what is and what is not within the confines of
a patent monopoly, courts should not expand protection beyond the scope
of the claims. 64 If the patentee wants to enlarge the scope of his claims, he
should use the reissue procedure. 65
B. Decisions in the Federal Circuit
After the Graver Tank decision, lower courts employed its test to determine
infringement under the Doctrine. 6 The Graver Tank test has also been
60. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1946) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982)) ("[tlhe specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.").
62. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 617 (dissent argued that it was mandate of Congress that a patent's precise claims
mark its monopoly boundaries; granting of patent is exception to competitive enterprise system,
therefore, it is important for businessmen to know what information they can freely use).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1946). The current version, at 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1982), states in relevant
part:
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to
claim in the patent, the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such patent and
the payment of the fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed
in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for
the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be
introduced into the application for reissue.
No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the
original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original
patent.
Id.
At the time of Graver Tank the courts had interpreted the statute as allowing expansion of
a claim, whereas the current version of the statute allows an expansion of the claim only within
two years from the grant of the original patent. The dissent also pointed out that broader
claims which included manganese silicate were held to be invalid by the same Court.
66. Examples of cases where lower courts have found infringement using the Graver Tank
test are: Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 965 (1973) (court found use of dry herbicide in multiple applications infringed patented
process of spraying water solution of same herbicide in one application); Kolene Corp. v. Motor
City Metal Treating Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971) (court
found defendant's use of a 46-50% cyanate bath infringed patentee's claim to bath containing
between 25%-40% cyanates). Examples of cases where lower courts have found no infringement
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followed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.67
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by
merging the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 61
The Federal Circuit was created to relieve the workload of the regional
courts of appeal, to obtain greater uniformity in the development and
application of patent law, and to make more effective use of available federal
judicial resources. 9 The Federal Circuit adopted as binding precedent the
holdings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA"). 70 Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has decided a number
of cases dealing with the Doctrine. 71 On some occasions the court has stated
that one must look to the invention as a whole, 72 while on other occasions
the court has stated that every element is material and an element-by-element
analysis should be employed. 73 This has led to an ambiguity in the interpre-
tation of the Doctrine. 74
The Federal Circuit's first major case regarding the Doctrine was Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States.75 The plaintiff claimed that the United States
using the Graver Tank test are: Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45, 52 (6th Cir. 1974)
(no infringement in defendant's use of pin instead of plaintiff's nail in a device for hip surgery,
because there was no evidence that pin would produce same result as the nail); General Dynamics
Corp. v. Whitcomb, 443 F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)
(defendant's change in wing design was not a matter of form since form was the "essence" of
the invention).
67. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
68. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). A
detailed description of the creation of the Federal Circuit may be found in 3 D. CHISUM, supra
note 2, § 11.066[3][e].
69. 3 D. CitsuM, supra note 2, at § 11-106.1 to -106.3. See generally H.R. No. 312, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). "The new court that results from the merger brought about by this
bill will help alleviate the docket pressures on the regional courts of appeals by reallocating
and realigning existing judicial resources .... " Id at 18. "The new Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied
in patent litigation more predictable and will eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and
unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the field." Id. at 20.
70. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982). In a footnote, Chief
Judge Markey noted that the Federal Circuit had the power, while sitting en banc, to overrule
earlier holdings with appropriate explanation. Id. at 1370 n.2.
71. See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v.
Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717
F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
72. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (applying invention as a whole analysis); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying the Doctrine to device as a whole).
73. Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Essef Indus., Inc., 795 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Lemelson
v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
74. Harris, supra note 12.
75. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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had designed a spacecraft that infringed their patent. The patent in Hughes
("Williams patent") 76 involved a satellite, with the claims employing means-
plus-function language. 77 The Hughes court determined that the Williams
patent was not a pioneer invention and therefore not entitled to a broad
range of equivalents.7 1 Instead, the Williams patent was held to be a major
improvement patent which gave it a substantial range of equivalents. 79
Next, the Hughes court looked to the prosecution history, i.e., file wrapper,
to determine to what extent the Doctrine should be limited. 0 Based on the
prosecution history, the court determined that the Doctrine should apply."s
Although the patentee's claims had been amended, the issue of the case was
well within the boundaries of the amended claims. The Hughes court then
found error in the trial court"s failure to apply the Doctrine to the invention
as a whole.12 Using the invention as a whole criterion and the Graver Tank
three-part test, the court found that the United States spacecraft infringed
the Williams patent.8 3
76. Id. Hughes Aircraft Co. was the assignee of a patent which was granted to Williams
(the inventor) and will be referred to herein as the Williams patent.
77. Id. at 1357. Means-plus-function claims are allowed and defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1952), which states in relevant part:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id.
Thus, a means-plus-function clause does not contain details of the apparatus capable of
carrying out the function. Examples of means-plus-function language are: "input means in-
cluding a keyboard for entering digits .. . electronic means responsive to said signals for
performing arithmetic calculations . . . memory means for storing digits . . . arithmetic means
coupled to said memory means. . . means for selectively transferring numbers . . . means for
providing a visual display ...." Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
805 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986). At one time means-plus-function claims were not allowed.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementation Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
78. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362. The court stated that it was an earlier patent by
McLean which disclosed the basic concept in which a pulsed jet is used to precess the spin axis
of a spin-stabilized body. The Williams patent provided a major improvement on the basic
concept.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1363. The claims amended by the patentee still contained control of the satellite
by a ground crew. The method of control by a ground crew was the issue in the case.
82. Id. at 1364. ("[tlhe failure to apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention
as a whole, and the accompanying demand for 'obvious and exact' equivalents of two elements
the presence of which would have effectively produced literal infringement, was error.")
(emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1366. The accused spacecraft and the Williams spacecraft differed in that: 1) the
accused spacecraft stores the ISA position in a computer whereas the Williams spacecraft
transmits the information to a ground crew; and, 2) the accused spacecraft receives and stores
jet firing information whereas the Williams spacecraft receives and immediately executes the
firing signals. The court found that substitution of an on-board computer to store and calculate
information instead of the ground crew performing such a function was not enough to avoid
infringement. Id.
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The Federal Circuit again used the invention as a whole analysis in Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n.84 Texas Instruments
brought suit against twenty one foreign calculator manufacturers for unfair
trade practices alleging infringement of several claims of its patent on an
electronic calculator.85 The claims of the Texas Instrument patent were
described in means-plus-function language. After going through the clauses
of the claims, the Texas Instrument court found that every function in the
Texas Instrument patent was performed by the accused calculators.
8 6 The
court determined that in a combination invention, such as this, a proper
analysis involved looking at the invention as a whole.8 7 The court looked to
the invention as a whole, and held that the accumulated differences in the
accused devices were beyond the fair range of equivalents that should be
allotted the Texas Instruments patent and, therefore, there was no infringe-
ment under the Doctrine. 8
In contrast to Hughes and Texas Instruments, the Federal Circuit has also
used an element-by-element analysis in determining infringement under the
Doctrine. This trend began with Lemelson v. United States.
8 9 In its analysis
of the Doctrine, the Lemelson court stated that every element of a claim is
essential and material and, thus, in order to show infringement every element
or its equivalent must be present in the accused device. 90 Because one element
was missing from the accused device, the Lemelson court found no infringe-
ment. 9'
84. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
85. Id. at 1560.
86. Id. at 1568. The functions performed by the patented and accused calculators were: a)
input means by "one set of decimal number keys," b) electronic means by an "integrated
semiconductor circuit array," and, c) display means. Id.
87. Id. at 1569 (court stated that Texas Instrument patent represented pioneer invention
and was entitled to broad equivalents).
88. Id. at 1570. The court found the following differences between means specified by the
Texas Instrument patent and the accused calculators: 1) conductive strip input means versus
scanning matrix encoder; 2) bipolar semiconductor electronic means versus metal oxide semi-
conductors with integrated circuits; and, 3) thermal printer versus liquid crystal display. How-
ever, a broad reading of the claims meant that each means would fall within the scope of each
clause of the claim. The court went on to state that the proper analysis involves looking at the
invention as a whole and when all the changes were looked at in terms of the whole calculator,
the court found no infringement. See also Moeller v. lonetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 656-57 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (court looked to device and invention as a whole to determine infringement);
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, 714 F.2d 1110, 1115 n.2 (Fed Cir. 1983) ("[ain infringer
appropriates an invention not words").
89. 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp.,
732 F.2d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (accused system lacked element of the patent claims and
therefore did not infringe).
90. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (invention in Lemelson was a device
for measuring distance between two surfaces of a workpiece).
91. Id. (patented device contained a manipulation means whereas accused device did not).
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This element-by-element approach was adopted in Chemical Eng'g Corp.
v. Essef Indus. Inc.92 Looking to the prosecution history, the court noted
that raising the pH in the plaintiff's water treatment system in the specific
manner claimed was crucial to patentability. 9 Since the accused device did
not raise the pH in the manner claimed, the Chemical Eng'g court found
no infringement under the Doctrine. 94
The most recent case to apply the element-by-element approach was Perkin
Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.95 The invention in the Perkin
Elmer patent related to an electrodeless discharge lamp, with the issue being
whether tap coupling, the claimed invention, was the same as loop coupling,
the accused device. 96 The Perkin Elmer court first stated that the Doctrine
cannot be used to erase structural and functional language in a claim.97 The
court distinguished the case at bar from Hughes, stating that the Hughes
statement regarding the invention as a whole referred to infringement of an
entire claim. In contrast, the case at bar dealt with a means-plus-function
limitation, or merely one element of a claim.98 Applying the Lemelson concept
that each element of a claim is material and essential, the Perkin Elmer
court found that the loop coupling did not function in the same way as the
claimed tap coupling and, accordingly, there was no infringement. 99
It is clear that the Federal Circuit, while employing the Graver Tank test
for infringement under the Doctrine, has applied the test in two distinct
ways. On some occasions the court has stated that one must look to the
invention as a whole,100 while on other occasions the court has stated that
92. 795 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (case involved patent for water treatment of domestic
water supplies).
93. Id. at 1572-73. The patent at issue related to a method for removing iron from well
water. The patented process, as amended, required "gradually raising the pH of the water to
7.0-7.5 while filtering . . .directly through a mineral bed comprised of a mineral capable of
raising the pH to 7.0-7.5." Id. at 1572 n.7. The accused device did not raise the pH and
therefore, the court found no infringement under the Doctrine. Id. at 1572.
94. Id.
95. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 1531. Tap coupling and loop coupling refers to a resonator transformer for an
electrodeless discharge lamp (EDL). The tap coupler is an autotransformer-type coupler with a
tap point variably located on the helical coil for connecting it to the r-f power source. The
loop coupler is a transformer-type (not autotransformer) coupler in which the connecting point
between the helical coil and the r-f power source is not fixed for purposes of frequency tuning
or impedance matching. However, as the dissent pointed out "[b]oth transformers perform the
same function (electrical power transfer), in the same way (electromagnetic induction), with the
same result (excitation of the resonator)." Id. at 1541.
97. Id. at 1532. That is, the public is entitled to notice regarding the bounds of the monopoly.
98. Id. at 1532-33. The Hughes statement should not mean that claim limitations should be
treated as insignificant or immaterial in determining infringement.
99. Id. at 1535. A lengthy dissent was filed by Circuit Judge Newman in which she accused
the majority of rewriting precedent, namely Hughes, and not looking to the invention as a
whole. Using the invention as a whole analysis, Judge Newman would have found infringement
because the accused device performed the same function in the same way to obtain substantially
the same result. Id. at 1535-44.
100. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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every element is material and an element-by-element analysis should be
used. 101
II. THE Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand- Wayland, Inc. DECISION
In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 02 the Federal Circuit con-
sidered en banc the application of the Doctrine. The court looked to its own
precedents as well as Supreme Court precedents to determine that an element-
by-element analysis should be used to decide infringement under the Doc-
trine. 103 Using this analysis, the majority found no infringement.1 0°4
A. Factual and Procedural History
Pennwalt sued Durand-Wayland for infringing Claims 1, 2, 10 and 18
("claims-at-issue") of its United States Patent number 4,106,628 ('628
patent"). 05 In its amended answer, Durand-Wayland attacked the validity
of the '628 patent, denied infringement and alleged several counterclaims.' °0
The patent in question related to a sorter of fruits and other items. 0 7 The
sorter was a machine that was able to electronically determine the weight
and color of the items and sort them into one of several combined weight
and color categories. Durand-Wayland manufactured and sold two types of
sorting machines which used software to do the sorting. One machine sorted
items by weight while the second machine sorted by weight and color. 08
The trial court issued an opinion which concluded: 1) the '628 patent was
valid; and, 2) the accused devices did not infringe any of the claims-at-issue,
either literally or under the Doctrine.' °9 Both parties appealed.
101. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
102. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1226, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1474 (1988).
103. Id. at 935.
104. Id. at 939.
105. Id. at 932. Claims 1 and 2 relate to a sorter which conveys items along a track having
an electronic-weighing device that produces an electrical signal proportional to the weight of
the item. Id. at 933. Additionally, the sorter has a signal comparison means, clock means,
position indicating means and discharge means. The sorter of claims 10 and 18 combines a
weighing device and an optical scanner. The signals from the weighing device and color sensor
are combined and an appropriate signal is sent at the proper time to discharge the item into
the container corresponding to its color and weight. Id. Each step of claims 10 and 18 is
performed by discrete electrical components which are hard wired into a network, the details
of which were presented in the specification. Id.
106. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 558 (N.D. Ga 1984)
(parties agreed that patent validity and infringement issues should be tried first).
107. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 933.
108. Id.
109. First, the district court found that all the elements of the Pennwalt patent were not
present in the Durand device and thus there was no literal infringement. Second, the district
court found that the microprocessor and software of Durand were not functional equivalents
of the hard-wired components of Pennwalt. Pennwalt, 225 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 572.
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B. Majority Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Although the case was argued before a panel of the Federal Circuit, the
case was decided en banc." 0 The Pennwalt court first looked at whether the
Durand-Wayland sorter literally infringed the Pennwalt sorter."' Since the
Pennwalt claims were written in means-plus-function language, the court
looked to the specification to discern the structure described therein." 2
Comparing the structure in the specification to the Durand structure, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of no literal infringe-
ment. 13
Having found no literal infringement, the court looked at whether there
was infringement under the Doctrine. The Pennwalt court began its Doctrine
analysis by stating the test set forth in Graver Tank. 114 The court determined
that in order to find infringement, every element of a claim or its substantial
equivalent must be present in the accused device." 5 Under this analysis, the
district court found that the position indicating functions were missing from
the accused device while other functions were performed in a substantially
different way. 116 The Federal Circuit approved of the district court's element-
by-element analysis for infringement under the Doctrine and used the same
analysis to determine whether the district court was clearly erroneous.' 7
The Pennwalt court first looked to the prosecution history, or file wrapper,
to determine the appropriate range of equivalents applicable to the Pennwalt
patent."' Based on the file wrapper, the Pennwalt court upheld the district
court's finding that the invention in-suit wag not a pioneer invention, but
an improvement in a crowded art." 9 The Pennwalt court also observed that
during prosecution a position indicating means element was added, and that
110. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 932. An en banc consideration is an extraordinary procedure one
purpose of which is to bring to the entire court a precedent setting question of exceptional
importance. See FED. R. App. P. 35.
111. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 933.
112. Id. at 934 (this analysis was carried out to determine if there was literal infringement).
113. Id. (fact that accused device did not have a position indicating means which patented
device contained negated possibility of finding literal infringement).
114. The specific language used by the Court is that an accused device must perform
"substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain
substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention." Id.
115. Id. at 935 ("'It is ... well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential,
and that in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of
every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device."') (quoting Lemelson v. United
States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
116. 833 F.2d at 935.
117. Id. at 935-37.
118. Id. at 937 (court noted that claims had been properly narrowed during prosecution to
assure that claims would not read on the prior art).
119. Id. (because invention was carefully described so that it did not read on the prior art,
invention was classified as an improvement invention).
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this element was crucial to patentability. 120 The trial court found and the
appellate court affirmed that the Durand sorters did not contain a first or
second position indicating means.' 2' Further, the Pennwalt majority found
that the software used in the Durand sorters was not equivalent to the hard-
wired circuitry of Pennwalt.12 Because no component in the Durand sorters
performed an equivalent function to the function of the first position indi-
cating means component, the majority held there was no infringement under
the Doctrine. 2 1
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent agreed with the majority that there was no literal infringe-
ment. 124 However, the dissent strongly argued that the majority's interpre-
tation of the Doctrine was contrary to the precedent of the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court. 125 The dissent argued that although the majority
"facially" retained the Graver Tank test, it had "eviscerated" the test's
underlying rationale. 2 6 Further, the dissent stated that the majority ignored
precedent which dictates that the proper analysis under the Doctrine is to
examine the invention as a whole. 127
In support of its contention that the majority had departed from recent
precedent, the dissent first looked to Hughes Aircraft.12 The Hughes court
held that the Doctrine must be applied to the invention as a whole. 12 9
According to the dissent, had the Hughes court applied an element-by-
element analysis, they would have found no infringement. 30 Further, the
dissent felt that the majority's current analysis was no more than a search
120. Id. (prior art disclosed storing information with respect to sorting criteria, but did not
continuously track location of objects; after the words "continuously indicating" were added,
claim was allowed).
121. 833 F.2d at 937.
122. Id. at 938. Examples of hard-wired components are shift registers, comparators, shaft
encoders and gates. The Durand-Wayland device uses a computer and software to do the
sorting. Pennwalt, 225 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 559-60.
123. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 939.
124. Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 940 ("in practical effect, the majority has eviscerated the underlying rationale of
Graver Tank by requiring, under the doctrine of equivalents, an exact equivalent for each
element of the claimed invention.").
127. Id. (citing Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Carmen Indus., Inc.
v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
128. 833 F.2d at 941.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 942. The Hughes space satellite received and sent out signals in order to adjust
the position of the satellite. In contrast, the accused spacecraft performed those functions by
using an onboard computer. This is analogous to replacement of the hard-wired circuitry by a
computer in the case at bar. Id.
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for "obvious and exact equivalents" which was denounced in Hughes as a
proxy for a finding of literal infringement.
Next, the dissent criticized the majority's narrow view of the interchange-
ability of the elements of the accused device and those of the claimed device
and explored the question of whether a microprocessor and its accompanying
software were an equivalent substitution for hard-wired circuitry.'3 ' The
dissent pointed out that the trial court's finding that the microprocessor did
not perform each of the functions of the hard-wired circuitry was part of
the district court's literal infringement analysis and was inappropriately
applied by the majority to the Doctrine analysis. 32 The dissent noted that
this finding reflected nothing more than the inherent differences between
microprocessors and hard-wired circuitry and should not preclude a finding
of infringement under the Doctrine.'33 However, the majority had blurred
the concept of literal infringement under 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph
6, and the Doctrine's infringement analysis. The dissent contended that the
proper analysis should focus on whether "the changes or substitutions made
alter substantially the way that the accused device works when compared to
the claimed invention." 34
The dissent claimed that the majority erred in interpreting the meaning of
the term "position indicating means" and stated that the accused device and
the claimed invention indicate position in equivalent manners.' According
to the dissent, both devices continually store weight and color data of an
item until it is discharged. The claimed invention does this by using shift
registers while the accused device does it by a queue and pointers which
move with the conveyor cups.'6 Thus, even though Pennwalt restricted its
claims during prosecution, those limitations are irrelevant since the accused
device performs a continuous position indicating means.'37
The dissent also felt the majority had incorrectly evaluated Pennwalt's
assertion that the Pennwalt sorter compares the color of an item before the
item goes to the weight scale, whereas the Durand sorter does the comparison
131. Id. at 942.
132. Id. at 942-43 (dissent noted that quote of district court cited by majority regarding an
element-by-element analysis was actually part of district court's literal infringement analysis).
133. 833 F.2d at 942.
134. Id. at 948. In a related inquiry, the dissent noted that an exploration into whether one
"reasonably skilled in the art" would have known of the interchangeability of the hard-wired
circuitry and the microprocessor was appropriate. Id. at 942. The dissent, however, chastised
the district court for focusing on whether one reasonably skilled in the art would know how
to substitute one mechanism for the other. Id. The dissent argued that the narrow focus of the
district court inquiry was inappropriate because, under a doctrine of equivalents analysis, a
sufficient degree of flexibility was necessary in order to reach a just result and impose a
requirement that the alleged infringer know how to substitute interchangeable components
restricted this necessary flexibility. Id. at 942 n.5.
135. Id. at 944.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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after the weight scale. According to Pennwalt, this is merely a change in the
position of an element of the sorter which is insufficient to avoid infringe-
ment. The majority had stated that Pennwalt's assertion was significantly
flawed because the claimed invention required the position indicating means
to be responsive to a specified signal and the accused device did not have
such a specified signal. 3 ' According to the dissent, the majority's view
reflected nothing more than a literal infringement analysis. By looking at
the devices as a whole, however, the dissent found equivalent functions and,
therefore, infringement under the Doctrine.
Finally, the dissent addressed the fact that the majority, in its Pennwalt
opinion, adopted the position of the dissenting opinion in Graver Tank. 13 9
The Pennwalt dissent stated that the Doctrine represents a choice between
two conflicting policies. The two policies are: 1) giving notice to the public
of the metes and bounds of a patent; and, 2) giving the patentee complete
and fair protection of his invention. The device as a whole test reflects a
preference for the latter policy. The dissent noted that the tension between
the two policies and the inability to fully reconcile the two views had long
been recognized and accepted by the courts.,4o Pointing to Graver Tank, the
dissent argued that the majority's decision to focus on the policy choice of
notice to the public was shortsighted.' 4' Elaborating on this, the dissent went
on to say that the majority's holding essentially says that "unimportant and
insubstantial" changes are enough to show that an accused device does not
function in substantially the same way and, therefore, does not infringe
under the Doctrine.'4 2
In conclusion, the dissent asserted that the proper inquiry was to consider
the device as a whole when applying the Graver Tank test. Because the
district court had not properly addressed the question of which inquiry was
appropriate, the dissent wanted to remand the case to the district court for
a proper determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 43
D. Additional Views by Circuit Judge Nies
Circuit Judge Nies submitted additional views in support of the majority
position. The objective of her "Additional Views" was to review precedents
138. Id.
139. 833 F.2d at 945.
140. Id. at 945-46. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692
(2d Cir. 1948), where Judge Learned Hand stated:
[o]n proper occasions courts make . . . [claims] cover more than their meaning
will bear. If they applied the law with inexorable rigidity, they would never do this
... . [But] at times they resort to the 'doctrine of equivalents' to temper unsparing
logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention. No doubt,
this is strictly speaking an anomaly; but it is one which courts have frankly faced
and accepted almost from the beginning.
Id. at 692.
141. Pennwal, 833 F.2d at 946-47.
142. Id. at 947 (arguing that under majority's analysis, change in form is enough to avoid
infringement).
143. Id. at 948-49.
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on the Doctrine and demonstrate that the majority's opinion did not overrule
any of these precedents. Judge Nies began her analysis by reviewing the
current statutes setting forth the requirements of claims.44 Judge Nies then
presented a long list of cases which held that all elements of a combination
claim are essential and material and that omission of one of these elements
avoids infringement. 145 Finally, she argued that the principle that an infring-
ing device must contain every element of a claimed device was not discarded
by Graver Tank. 46
Judge Nies contended that the element-by-element analysis applied by the
majority was consistent with Graver Tank. 47 According to Judge Nies, one
must read Hughes in light of the "given" principle that in order for there
to be infringement, every element of a claim must be present in the accused
device. 48 She argued that Hughes did not depart from the "all elements
rule," i.e., every element of a claim must be present in the accused device. 149
Judge Nies stated that the Hughes court analyzed each element of the claim
and found equivalent functions of the elements, thereby satisfying the "all
elements rule."' 50 Thus, the majority applied an element-by-element analy-
sis. 151
Judge Nies indicated that she believed that reading Hughes as support for
an analysis which fails to examine the individual elements of a claim was
inaccurate. According to Judge Nies, part of the misreading of Hughes has
been due to the confusion in the two step "double function" inquiry. 52
144. Id. at 949 (Nies, J., additional views) (35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that inventor particularly
point out and distinctly claim subject matter of his invention).
145. Id. at 949-52. See, e.g., Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every
element or its substantial equivalent"); Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 403 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) ("it is necessary that every element or its substantial equivalent be found in the
accused structures"); Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 332, 335-37 (1879) ("Ithe
claim of a combination is not infringed if any of the material parts of the combination are
omitted"); Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842) (omission of a part of
combination patent avoids infringement).
146. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 952. Judge Nies noted that only when the Graver Tank Court
determined that manganese was equivalent to magnesium did the court find infringement. Judge
Nies concluded that the equivalents in the doctrine of equivalents refers to equivalents of the
elements. Id.
147. Id. at 953. See Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("It]he failure to apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a whole, and
the accompanying demand for 'obvious and exact' equivalents of two elements which would
effectively produce literal infringement, was error.").
148. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 953.
149. Id. See 4 D. CmisuM, supra note 2, § 18.03[4], setting forth the All Elements Rule, "It
follows that a claim will not cover or 'read on' any device or process unless that device or
process contains all the elements of the claims (or an equivalent thereof within the meaning of
the doctrine of equivalents)."
150. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 953. See supra note 77 for the language of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
151. 833 F.2d at 953.
152. Id. at 954 n.3.
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That inquiry looks to: 1) how the device functions or works; and, 2) the
function in a means-plus-function element."' The first step of the inquiry
looks to whether the accused device and the claimed device function in the
same way, whereas the second step of the inquiry focuses on the function
of the individual elements. 5 4 The Hughes court found that the device per-
formed an equivalent function and that the elements at issue, while not
literally equivalent, were functionally equivalent.155 Judge Nies argued that
by requiring equivalency in each element, Hughes was consistent with case
law. 1 6 However, by failing to recognize the fact that the Hughes court
looked to both the invention as a whole and the elements individually, other
courts had misread Hughes. '57
Judge Nies concluded her analysis by looking to the requirements the
statutes place on a patent applicant.'5 The statutes require specificity in the
claims so that the public has notice of what constitutes a patentee's rights.
Therefore, she felt that courts should not broaden claims because that would
be a violation of due process and contrary to the statutes.'59
E. Commentary By Circuit Judge Newman
Judge Newman submitted a lengthy commentary in which she stated that
the majority opinion contradicted precedents and represented a retrenchment
of the court's equitable authority.16° Judge Newman reviewed the issue on
appeal and then presented a thorough review of the Doctrine. Judge Newman
began her commentary by examining the process by which claims evolved
and early courts determined infringement.' 6' Judge Newman then traced: 1)
how the Supreme Court had applied the Doctrine to the invention as a whole
and to parts thereof; 62 2) how the range of equivalents allowed an invention
depends on the degree of the invention;' 63 3) why some elements of an
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 953.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 954 n.3.
158. Id. at 954 (patent applicants must particularly point out and distinctly claim subject
matters which they regard as their inventions).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 954-75 (Newman, J., commentary).
161. Id. at 957-59.
162. Id. at 959-63. Judge Newman used cases such as: Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30 (1929); Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 531 (1864); McCormick v. Talcott, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 402 (1858); and Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), to support
her position that courts have looked to the invention as a whole in determining infringement
under the Doctrine. Id.
163. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 963-64. Pioneer inventions are entitled to a broad range of
equivalents, marked improvement inventions are entitled to a substantial range of equivalents
and narrow improvement inventions are entitled to limited or no range of equivalents. See
supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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invention may be more important than others;' 64 and, 4) how the Doctrine
applies to the case of a combination of old elements.' 65 Judge Newman also
presented cases which held that omission of an element did not avoid
infringement. 6
Next, Judge Newman reviewed decisions in the Federal Circuit and policy
considerations 167 favoring the Doctrine. In conclusion, Judge Newman stated
that all precedent pointed to the application of the Doctrine to the invention
as a whole and that the Doctrine should not be governed by a strict
formula.' 6 s
III. ANALYSIS
This section will show that the Pennwalt decision significantly changed
the test for infringement under the Doctrine. The element-by-element test
adopted by the Pennwalt court effectively overruled Graver Tank. Although
the element-by-element test used by the majority is very easy to apply, it
does not provide the equitable protection for which the Doctrine was in-
tended. 169 The majority's test under the Doctrine is virtually indistinguishable
from literal infringement as defined by 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph
6.170
164. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 964-65 (changes in immaterial features would not avoid infringe-
ment).
165. Id. at 965-67 (since early patents only enumerated essential elements in the claims,
removal of one of the elements of a combination avoided infringement).
166. Id. at 967-69. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 227 U.S. 165 (1913)
(infringement not avoided by omitting sand backing that was element of claim); Royer v.
Schultz Belting Co., 135 U.S. 319 (1890) (whether omission of pins or rollers avoids infringement
is question of fact for jury).
167. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 970-74.
168. Id. at 974.
169. See Nieman, The Federal Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents,
70 J. PAT. OFF Soc'Y 153 (1988). The author suggests a framework based on the reasoning in
Pennwalt. The framework involves a three-part test, the first two parts of which look to whether
the accused device achieves substantially the same result and performs substantially the same
function as the claimed invention. The third part is stated as follows:
Determine whether the accused device operates in substantially the same way as the
claimed invention. In so doing, compare each element of the claim with the accused
device to determine whether the accused device contains each element or its sub-
stantial equivalent. A substantial equivalent is one that causes the accused device
to operate in substantially the same way as the claimed invention, considering the
nature, purpose and quality of the element and its corresponding structure in the
accused device.
Id. at 159 (footnotes omitted).
170. An analysis under § 112 involves finding an equivalent structure as well as identity of
claimed function for that structure. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934 (citing Palumbo v. Don-Joy
Co., 762 F.2d 969 (Fed Cir. 1985); D.M.I., Inc., v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Radio Steele & Mfg. Co., v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The
Doctrine analysis looks to whether the accused device performs substantially the same function.
Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.
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The premise on which the majority based its analysis is that each element
of a claim is material and essential. 7 ' This is certainly true and is substan-
tiated by a long line of cases. 1 2 As Judge Newman pointed out in her
commentary, however, there are exceptions to the rule. 173 The cases cited by
Judge Newman essentially state that if the element omitted is immaterial,
infringement may still be found. By immaterial, the courts mean that the
invention as a whole is not affected by elimination of the element.174 There-
fore, despite the general rule that an accused device must contain all the
elements of a claim, infringement may be found when an element is omitted
from an accused device. 75
Furthermore, it is unclear whether, when the majority says 'element,' they
in fact mean 'limitation.' The majority interchanges 'element' and 'limitation'
throughout its entire opinion.' 76 As the court stated in Perkin-Elmer:
"[r]eferences to 'elements' can be misleading.' ' 7 7 The word 'element' has
been used to refer to both a component of a device and a limitation of a
claim.' 8 It is the limitation of a claim which is used to determine infringe-
ment. Therefore, if by 'element' the Pennwalt majority meant 'limitation,'
then certainly in order to find infringement under the Doctrine the accused
device must contain all the 'limitations' found in the claim.
However, a proper Doctrine analysis does more than determine if there is
a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a patented device and
those of an accused device. Under the Doctrine, a determination of infringe-
ment looks to whether the function of an element in a patented device is
present in an accused device. This has necessitated that courts look to whether
the accused device and the patented device "as a whole" perform the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result. For example,
the Hughes court held that a proper Doctrine analysis requires the reviewing
171. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.
172. See, e.g., Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Autogiro
Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967) and references therein.
173. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 967-68.
174. AMI Indus., Inc. v. EA Indus., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 568, 590 (W.D.N.C. 1979)
("[i]mmaterial variations in an accused infringing device will not avoid infringement."); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Klimsch-Repro, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 586, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[m]oreover, no
single element or group of elements can be deemed to represent the 'heart' or 'gist' of the
invention, so that infringement may be found despite the omission of other, insignificant
elements from the accused device.") (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 365 U.S.
336 (1961)).
175. American Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum Steel Co., 290 F. 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1923)
("omitting silicon, defendant has produced stainless steel; with the silicon added, it has also
produced stainless steel; therefore in respect of infringement, the silicon is immaterial"); United
States v. Harvey Steel Co., 227 U.S. 165 (1913) (infringement of claimed invention not avoided
by omitting sand backing element).
176. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 937.
177. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
178. Id.
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court to look at the invention as a whole. 79 Again in Martin v. Barber,'0
the Federal Circuit stated that the fact finder must determine if the com-
ponents viewed as a whole operate in substantially the same way, and have
substantially the same function and achieve substantially the same result as
the claimed invention.'"' Although the invention as a whole phrase was not
used by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank, it is implicit in the phraseology
the Court used. The Graver Tank Court stated that equivalence does not
require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect.82 The
Graver Tank Court referred to the flux and accused composition as being
substantially equivalent in operation.'83
Furthermore, the cases relied on by the majority as the basis of its element-
by-element analysis contain language which indicates that one should look
to the operation of a device as a whole.'8 4 For example, in Perkin-Elmer,
the court found the differences in the devices such that the devices as a
whole did not operate in substantially the same way.8 5 In Lemelson, the
"manipulation means" was found to be absent from the accused device and,
therefore, there was no infringement.'8 6 Lemelson and the other cases cited
by Judge Nies in her additional views are all based on the omission of an
element which resulted in the accused device not working in substantially
the same way as the patented device."7
In Pennwalt, the majority looked to the file wrapper and noted that the
addition of a position indicating means was crucial to patentability.' The
majority then stated that if such a limitation were absent from a device,
that device would not operate in substantially the same way as the claimed
invention.8 9 The majority did not find a position indicating means but
stopped short of looking for equivalent functions in the accused device
because it determined that any combination of components would not be
responsive to the specified signal in the Pennwalt patent.' 90 As the dissent
stated, this type of analysis is nothing more than a test for literal infringe-
ment. '9'
179. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
180. 755 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
181. Id.
182. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
183. Id. at 610-11. The Court stated that "[c]onsideration must be given to the purpose for
which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other
ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform." Id. at 609.
184. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Essef Indus., Inc., 795 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Lemelson v.
United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732
F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
185. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1530 n.5.
186. Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 155.
187. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 973.
188. Id. at 937.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 938.
191. Id. at 945 (Bennett, J., dissenting in part).
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Assuming that the trial court correctly determined that the Durand device
did not contain a position indicating means or a substantial equivalent, then
the Federal Circuit Court should have clearly stated that file wrapper estoppel
required a finding that there was no infringement. 92 It was not necessary
for the majority to set up a narrow and restrictive test for determining
infringement under the Doctrine.
Contrary to the admonitions of the Supreme Court in Graver Tank, the
majority's test makes the Doctrine a prisoner of a formula which is virtually
identical to literal infringement. Until Pennwalt, literal infringement and the
Doctrine have been separate and usually anomalous concepts. Literal in-
fringement is determined by the exact words of the claims which define the
invention, and courts may only interpret the claims and not rewrite them.193
This definition of infringement gives clear notice to the public as to what
the metes and bounds of the patent monopoly are and allows the public to
"engineer" around the monopoly. However, under the Doctrine, literal
overlap is not required. To find infringement, the structures must do the
same work in substantially the same way and accomplish the same result.
Thus, the Doctrine provides a greater scope of protection to the patent
owner. ,9,
The Doctrine was created for those situations in which an infringer copies
the substance of an invention without copying all or part of its form. As
Judge Durfee stated in Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States: "[tihe doctrine
of equivalents casts around a claim a penumbra which also must be avoided
if there is to be no infringement."'' 95 The Doctrine allows a patentee to
obtain the complete rights to his invention which he may not obtain by a
literal reading of his claims. In this sense the Doctrine is an equitable doctrine,
because it does not allow an infringer to avoid the literal meaning of the
claims while copying the substance of the invention.
Clearly, there is tension between the public's right to notice of the bounds
of the patented invention and the patentee's right to his complete invention.
This tension has existed since the Supreme Court established the Doctrine
in Winans. The closely divided Court in Winans struck the balance between
these two policies in favor of greater protection for the patent owner. 96
192. Although file wrapper estoppel is usually triggered by a patentee invoking the Doctrine,
it does not apply only when the Doctrine is invoked. 4 D. CHnsuM, supra note 2, § 18.05 [4].
193. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d at 395-96.
194. Id. at 399-400 (purpose of the law is to benefit inventor's genius and not scrivener's
talents).
195. Id. at 400.
196. Judge Learned Hand on two occasions articulated the tension between the two policies.
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948); Claude
Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1929). In Claude Neon
Lights, Judge Hand stated:
The doctrine of equivalents, though well settled for many years, is anomalous if
the claim is measured only by its words. . . .On the one hand, therefore, the
claim is not to be taken at its face-however freely construed-but its elements
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When the Supreme Court faced the Doctrine in Graver Tank, the Court,
again closely divided, struck the balance on the side of the patent owner.
The dissenting justices in both Winans and Graver Tank wanted to strike
the balance on the side of notice to the public.197 They believed that once
the claims were written, there should be no deviation from their literal
meaning. 198 According to the dissent in Graver Tank, Congress, through its
enactment of the patent laws, had adequately protected patentees from fraud,
piracy, and stealing. 19 The Pennwalt majority failed to address the existing
tension between notice to the public and a patentee's rights. It is Judge Nies
in her commentary who brought up this point. 200
Had the Pennwalt test been applied to the facts in Graver Tank the Court
would have found no infringement. In Graver Tank, one of the elements of
the claim was an alkaline earth silicate, magnesium silicate in particular,
which was not present in the accused composition.20 Thus, under the Penn-
walt test, an element of the claim was missing and the accused composition
could not function in the same way as the claimed composition. Even if
some other element present in the accused composition was a substantial
equivalent of the magnesium silicate in the claimed composition, there would
still have been no infringement under the Pennwalt test. The Pennwalt test
states that one must look to whether each element functions in the same
way, yet the only way to determine if manganese functions in the same way
as magnesium is if the flux as a whole has the same properties. 202 Because
the Pennwalt test does not require a court to look to the invention as a
may be treated as examples of a class which may be extended more or less broadly
as the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the originality of the discovery
makes desirable. On the other, it is not to be ignored as a guide in ascertaining
those elements of the disclosure which constitute the 'invention,' and without which
there could be no patent at all. It is obviously impossible to set any theoretic limits
to such a doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in misericordiam to
relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning. Somewhat the
same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation of any verbal expression, and
perhaps the best that can be said is that in the case of patent claims much greater
liberties are taken than would be allowed elsewhere.
Id. at 575-76.
197. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting) (adoption of the Doctrine causes uncertainty: "manufacturer cannot rely
on what the language of a patent claims . . . [he must] forecast how far a court relatively
unversed in a particular technological field will expand the claims language .... "); Winans
v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (public interest demands
that patent owner describe that which he claims as his invention with "[flullness, clearness,
exactness, preciseness, and particularity" and be held thereto).
198. See supra note 197.
199. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615.
200. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 974 (Nies, J., dissenting).
201. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
202. Id. at 611 ("[tlhe trial judge found on the evidence before him that the Lincolnweld
flux and the composition of the patent in suit are substantially identical in operation and in
result.").
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whole, there would have been no infringement in Graver Tank. Graver Tank
is, therefore, effectively overruled.
The shortcomings of the Pennwalt test are evident from the above example
which concerns a chemical composition. In most chemical compositions one
is concerned with how each element interacts with the other elements of the
composition. To isolate each element and determine whether an accused
device contains such an element or a substantial equivalent without regard
to the interaction of the element with the other elements in the accused
composition does not appear to be logical. It is more reasonable to apply
an element-by-element analysis to mechanical combinations where various
parts or means could legitimately be analyzed without regard to the other
means. However, even with regard to mechanical combinations, such an
approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the Doctrine and permits a
change in form to avoid infringement.
IV. IMPACT
The element-by-element test adopted by the Pennwalt court will have a
negative impact on patent owners by making it easier for others to circumvent
a patent. The Pennwalt test also represents a curtailment of the equitable
powers of a court applying the Doctrine. These two factors may make
inventors less willing to disclose their invention. Finally, practice before the
patent office may also be affected.
The Pennwalt court held that in determining whether an accused device
performs substantially the same function as a patented invention, a court
should carry out an element-by-element comparison. 20 3 In arriving at this
holding, the court stated that all elements of a claim are essential and
material.2° The holding appears to fall short of the requirements set down
by the court in Graver Tank, namely that "[e]quivalence, in the patent law,
is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in
a vacuum. ' 20 5 The Pennwalt court appears to have determined that if all
the elements of a claim are not present in an accused device there is no
infringement, even if the device as a whole performs substantially the same
function as the patented invention. A mere change in form is, therefore,
enough to avoid infringement.
If a change in form can now avoid infringement, then an inventor is "at
the mercy of verbalism" and it is the scrivener's talents and not the invention
that are being rewarded .2° An inventor may not receive the complete pro-
tection to which he is entitled. In turn, this may have a chilling effect on
203. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.
204. Id. at 935 (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528,
1532-33 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
205. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
206. Id. at 607.
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an inventor's willingness to disclose his invention. 0 7 Clearly, concealment of
inventions would frustrate the primary purpose of the patent system, which
is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts through disclosure
to the public of an inventor's creationz2s
In addition to fostering concealment of inventions, the Pennwalt decision
shifts the balance between the competing policies of notice to the public and
protection of the patentee's rights. Under the new test, the public knows
that if a device does not contain every element found in a claim then there
can be no infringement. The public and the potential infringer is, therefore,
fully aware of the limits of protection afforded existing patents. The price
for providing this notice, however, is the narrowing of the scope of protection
a patent owner is afforded.2 09
The Pennwalt decision also appears to affect the equitable powers of the
courts. The courts have been armed with equitable power in order to secure
complete justice. 210 Specifically, the Doctrine is meant to prevent the pirating
of a patentee's invention through the use of minor and formalistic devia-
tions.211 In the past, courts have had considerable discretion in looking at
the particular circumstances of the case and applying the Doctrine in order
to prevent the pirating of an invention. This discretion has been curtailed
and a court is permitted to look only to whether the accused device has a
substantial equivalent of each element of the claim. Accordingly, the courts
have less equitable power and the result of this is that complete justice may
not be possible in many cases.
Practice before the Patent Office may also be affected by the Pennwalt
decision. Applicants may be less willing to accept minor amendments to their
applications for fear that such an amendment may allow a copier to circum-
vent the patent. Applicants may also seek reissue applications more frequently
in order to expand the scope of their claims. Under the Pennwalt test, the
reissue procedure is the only way to expand the scope of the claims. 212 Both
of these actions would increase the volume of work at the Patent Office
which in turn may increase the amount of time necessary to process a patent
application.
207. It should be kept in mind that the burden of proving infringement is on the patent
owner and the Pennwalt test increases this burden because the patent owner must show the
presence of each and every element or its substantial equivalent. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934.
208. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. This is not to say that patentees will not ask courts to find infringement under the
Doctrine. Patent owners will still seek this protection, but because of the increased burden of
proof put on the patentee, the patentee will probably lose more decisions than in the past.
Therefore, the volume of litigation will probably remain the same.
210. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 970 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975) and cases cited therein).
211. Id.
212. The reissue procedure allows a patent owner to expand his claims within two years of
the issue of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1982).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in Pennwalt has established a test which states that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents must be determined by using
an element-by-element analysis and not an invention as a whole analysis. In
setting up this test, the Pennwait court has facially retained the test set forth
in Graver Tank, but has changed the substance of the test. This effectively
overrules Graver Tank. The result of the Pennwalt test is that the public
has clearer notice of what the metes and bounds of a patent are, but the
patentee's scope of protection has been drastically diminished.
Frank S. Molinaro


